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OPINION OF THE COURT 
__________ 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 
I. 
 
 The “first-filed rule” is a well-established policy of the 
federal courts that “[i]n all cases of concurrent jurisdiction, 
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the court which first has possession of the subject must decide 
it.”  Smith v. McIver, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 532, 535 (1824).  
This rule permits the district courts, in their discretion, to 
stay, transfer or dismiss cases that are duplicates of those 
brought previously in other federal fora.  See, e.g., Cedars-
Sinai Med. Ctr., et al., v. Shalala, 125 F.3d 765, 769 (9th Cir. 
1997).  Today, we are asked to review the contours of this 
rule and the discretion of the district courts under it. 
 
II. 
 
 This appeal is but a facet of procedurally intricate 
litigation concerning the alleged misuse of the pesticide 
dibromochloropropane (DBCP) on banana farms throughout 
Central America.  Litigation has been ongoing in various 
federal and state courts for decades.  Appellants—more than 
two hundred foreign agricultural workers—allege they were 
exposed to DBCP beginning in the 1960’s and ending 
sometime in the 1980’s.  They maintain that improper 
exposure to this pesticide is to blame for the numerous health 
problems they have endured.  Litigation began in 1993 with 
the filing of a putative class against the Dole Food Company, 
Inc., and other related companies in Texas state court.  To our 
knowledge, no court—federal or state—has ever reviewed the 
actual merits of Appellants’ claims.  Instead, these matters 
have continued in various courts around the country on purely 
procedural questions.  Not surprisingly, the procedural history 
associated with these cases is labyrinthine.  Here, however, 
we confine our discussion to the procedural history of DBCP 
litigation that was recently undertaken in two states: 
Louisiana and Delaware. 
A.  The Louisiana Action: Chaverri et al. v. Dole Food Co., 
Inc., et al. 
8 
 
 
 Numerous suits were filed in June of 2011 in the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Louisiana against Dole and others.1  Among other things, this 
lawsuit alleged claims sounding in negligence, strict liability, 
and breach of implied warranty.  The suits were consolidated 
and Dole moved for summary judgment.   
 
 On summary judgment, Dole argued that the 
Appellants’ claims were time-barred under Louisiana’s one-
year statute of limitations.  See La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 3492 
(West, Westlaw through 2014 Regular Session).  The District 
Court agreed and on September 17, 2012, granted Dole’s 
motion for summary judgment.  The matter was appealed to 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit on 
October 5, 2012.  The appeal was actively prosecuted, with 
oral argument taking place on September 4, 2013.  On 
September 19, 2013, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit affirmed the Louisiana District Court in an 
unpublished, per curiam opinion.  See Chaverri v. Dole Food 
Co., 546 Fed. App’x 409 (5th Cir. 2014). 
                                              
1 Named as defendants in the Louisiana action were Dole 
Food Company, Inc.; Dole Fresh Fruit Company; Standard 
Fruit Company; Standard Fruit and Steamship Company, Del 
Monte Fresh Produce N.A., Inc., Chiquita Brands 
International, Chiquita Brands, Inc., Maritrop Trading 
Corporation, Dow Chemical Company, Occidental Chemical 
Company, Amvaco Chemical Company and Shell Oil 
Company.  All of these entities joined in a motion to for 
summary judgment based on statute of limitations grounds.  
For simplicity, we will refer to this group of defendants as 
“Dole.” 
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B. Delaware Federal Litigation: the Subject of This 
Dispute. 
 
 Meanwhile, on June 1, 2012, while Dole’s motion for 
summary judgment was pending in Louisiana District Court, 
the Appellants filed several actions in the United States 
District Court for the District of Delaware.  These Delaware 
actions were brought against the same defendants listed in the 
Louisiana litigation and contained the same causes of action.2  
Importantly, Appellants admit that the actions filed in 
Delaware were “materially identical lawsuits” to those filed a 
year earlier in Louisiana.  Appellants’ Br. 12.   
 
 Dole Food Company filed a motion to dismiss the 
Delaware lawsuits on June 21, 2012, arguing for the 
application of the first-filed rule.  This motion was joined by 
Dole Fresh Fruit Company, Standard Fruit Company, 
Standard Fruit & Steamship Company, and AMVAC 
Chemical Corporation (hereinafter “Dole Appellees”).  The 
District Court agreed with the Dole Appellees and held that 
the first-filed rule applied to the Delaware cases.  It then was 
faced with the discretionary decision whether to stay or 
dismiss the proceedings.  The Delaware District Court 
dismissed the actions on August 21, 2012, reasoning that 
                                              
2 The set of defendants in this litigation are Dole Food 
Company, Inc.; Dole Fresh Fruit Company; Standard Fruit 
Company; Standard Fruit & Steamship Company; AMVAC 
Chemical Corp.; Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A., Inc.; 
Chiquita Brands International, Inc.; Chiquita Brands, LLC; 
The Dow Chemical Company; Occidental Chemical Corp.; 
and Shell Oil Company. 
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Appellants “filed in Delaware notwithstanding their choice to 
file first in Louisiana.  Decisions have consequences; one fair 
bite at the apple is sufficient.”  App. 19-20.   
 
 The day after the Delaware District Court dismissed 
Dole, Appellees Occidental Petroleum, Del Monte Produce 
N.A., Inc., Dow Chemical Co., and Shell Oil (hereinafter 
“Occidental Appellees”) likewise moved for dismissal based 
on the first-filed rule.  On March 29, 2013, the District Court 
granted the Occidental Appellees motion as well.  Although 
final judgment had been entered in the District Court for 
Louisiana, the District Court reasoned that the first-filed rule 
still applied because the case was on appeal to the Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. 
 
 While Appellants’ appeal was pending in the Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Appellee Chiquita Brands 
International, Inc., moved to dismiss, arguing a lack of 
personal jurisdiction.  Chiquita Brands LLC and Chiquita 
Fresh N.A. LLC moved for a dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and to dismiss based on res judicata and 
statute of limitations grounds.3  The Delaware District Court 
dismissed the claims against Chiquita Brands International on 
May 30, 2013, finding a lack of personal jurisdiction.  Later, 
on September 19, 2013, the Delaware District Court 
dismissed the remaining two Chiquita defendants (Chiquita 
Brands, LLC and Chiquita Fresh N.A. LLC) based on the 
first-filed rule and closed the case.   
 
                                              
3 Chiquita Brands International, Inc., joined in these motions, 
but only in the alternative in the event the District Court 
denied its motion to dismiss based on personal jurisdiction. 
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III. 
 We review the District Court’s decision to apply the 
first-filed rule for an abuse of discretion.  E.E.O.C. v. Univ. of 
Pa., 850 F.2d 969, 972 (3d Cir. 1988).4  This means we 
cannot disturb the District Court’s decision “unless there is a 
definite and firm conviction that the [District Court] 
committed a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it 
reached.”  Hanover Potato Prods., Inc. v. Shalala, 989 F.2d 
123, 127 (3d Cir. 1993) (internal citations and quotation 
marks omitted).  We see no clear error of judgment here and 
will affirm the District Court. 
 
A.  The First-Filed Rule 
 The first-filed rule counsels deference to the suit that 
was filed first, when two lawsuits involving the same issues 
and parties are pending in separate federal district courts.  
Univ. of Pa., 850 F.2d at 971.  We have been clear:  where 
there is federal concurrent jurisdiction over a matter, “the 
court which first ha[d] possession of the subject must decide 
it.”  Id. (quoting Crosley Corp. v. Hazeltine Corp., 122 F.2d 
925, 929 (3d Cir. 1941) (internal citations and quotations 
marks omitted)).  Appellants concede that they filed 
duplicative actions in the Delaware District Court, stating that 
the Delaware cases were “materially identical” to those they 
previously filed in Louisiana.  Appellants’ Br. 12.  Therefore, 
the pivotal question becomes whether concurrent jurisdiction 
                                              
4 The District Court exercised jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1332(a).  We exercise jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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existed at the time the Delaware actions were filed.  We hold 
that it did. 
 
 Claims against the Appellees were filed in Louisiana 
District Court on June 1, 2011, and those same claims were 
filed against the same Appellees on June 1, 2012 in Delaware 
District Court.  Therefore, concurrent jurisdiction existed on 
June 1, 2012 when the duplicative actions were filed.   
 
 The Appellants place great emphasis on the fact that 
the Louisiana cases were on appeal when the Delaware 
District Court dismissed the claims against the Occidental 
Appellees and two of the Chiquita Appellees.  They argue 
that by the time the Delaware District Court dismissed the 
actions, concurrent jurisdiction no longer existed.  But, as we 
see it, the procedural posture of the first-filed case on the date 
the second-filed actions were dismissed, is irrelevant to the 
analysis.  The relevant point-in-time is the filing date of the 
duplicative action.  If concurrent jurisdiction exists at that 
time, and the actions are truly duplicative, the first-filed rule 
can be invoked.  This is what we meant when we held that 
“the court which first has possession of the subject must 
decide it.”  Crosley Corp. v. Hazeltine Corp., 122 F.2d 925, 
929 (3d Cir. 1041) (quoting Smith, 22 U.S. at 535); Univ. of 
Pa., 850 F.2d at 971. 
 
 A court obtains possession of a case through the filing 
of a complaint and the date of that filing, therefore, is the 
relevant inquiry under the first-filed rule.  See, e.g., 
Collegiate Licensing Co. v. American Cas. Co. of Reading, 
Pa., 713 F.3d 71, 78 (11th Cir. 2013) (“The first-filed rule 
provides that when parties have instituted competing or 
parallel litigation in separate courts, the court initially seized 
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of the controversy should hear the case.” (internal citation 
omitted));  Alltrade, Inc. v. Uniweld Products, Inc., 946 F.2d 
622, 623 (9th Cir. 1991) (“[T]he well-established ‘first-to-file 
rule,’ which allows a district court to transfer, stay, or dismiss 
an action when a similar complaint has already been filed in 
another federal court  . . .”) (emphasis added).  Analyzing a 
case under the first-filed rule requires a district court, in a 
sense, to take a snap-shot of the cases at a particular moment 
in time:  the date of the filing of the second complaint.  If, on 
the date of the filing of the second-filed complaint, the 
matters are duplicative, that is, materially on all fours, then a 
district court has the discretion to stay, transfer, or dismiss the 
second-filed matter.  Here, materially identical cases against 
these same Appellees were pending in Louisiana District 
Court on June 1, 2012, the date the Appellants filed 
duplicative lawsuits in the Delaware District Court.  
Therefore, concurrent jurisdiction existed in June of 2012. 
 
B. The District Court’s Discretion and the Dismissal of 
the Delaware Actions 
 
 The Appellants next argue that, even if the first-filed 
rule was applicable, the Delaware District Court should have 
stayed or transferred the Delaware cases, and that dismissing 
them with prejudice instead was an abuse of discretion.  Our 
dissenting colleague agrees with this argument.  We, 
however, do not because such a position is in tension with the 
purposes of the rule and would result in a wrongful limitation 
on the scope of a district court’s discretion to fashion an 
appropriate response to a second-filed action.  The scope of 
the District Court’s discretion is very broad in these 
circumstances.  As we said earlier, we will not find an abuse 
of discretion under the first-filed rule “unless there is a 
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definite and firm conviction that the [District Court] 
committed a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it 
reached.”  Hanover Potato Prods., 989 F.2d at 127 (internal 
citation and quotation marks omitted).  
   
 The rationale underlying the first-filed rule is “to 
encourage[] sound judicial administration and to promote[] 
comity among the courts in the federal system.”  Univ. of Pa., 
850 F.3d at 971.  The import of the first-filed rule is 
commonsensical:  “[i]t is of obvious importance to all the 
litigants to have a single determination of their controversy, 
rather than several decisions which if they conflict may 
require separate appeals to different circuit courts of appeals.”  
Crosley, 122 F.2d at 930.  The Delaware District Court’s 
actions in this case are in line with the purposes of the rule.  
By dismissing these cases, the Delaware District Court 
“avoid[ed] burdening the federal judiciary and . . . 
prevent[ed] the judicial embarrassment of conflicting 
judgments.”  Univ. of Pa., 850 F.2d at 977 (citations omitted).  
Nor did the Delaware District Court act woodenly, inflexibly, 
or mechanically in its application of the rule.  Id. at 972, 976.  
Instead, by dismissing these duplicative cases, the District 
Court avoided “the waste of judicial time and energy.”  
Crosley, 122 F.3d at 930.   
 
 Also, dismissal with prejudice is an appropriate 
response to the Appellants’ own litigation strategy.  Three 
days after filing the Delaware lawsuits, the Appellants’ 
counsel informed the Louisiana District Court that the 
decision to file the duplicative law suits in Delaware District 
Court was strategic and that counsel recognized that: “the 
general rule is that duplicate cases in different federal judicial 
districts should not both proceed.”  App. at 388 (citations 
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omitted).  Counsel then asked for the Louisiana District 
Court’s “indulgence over the next several months,” and did 
not move to stay or dismiss the actions pending in Louisiana 
federal court.  Id.  The Appellants felt it was “imperative” to 
preserve and protect their claims in Louisiana by filing 
duplicate cases in Delaware, admitting to the Louisiana 
District Court that they had also filed suit in Delaware 
because: 
 
The Louisiana Supreme Court is 
expected to conclusively 
determine the [opt out] issue later 
this year and before the Delaware 
Supreme Court is likely to have 
the opportunity to squarely 
address the matter.  If the 
[Louisiana] Supreme Court rules 
that the Plaintiffs cases are not 
Prescribed, the Plaintiffs would 
elect to proceed in Louisiana 
because the prescription issue 
would have been conclusively 
determined.  But if this Court and 
the Louisiana Supreme Court 
determine that the cases are in fact 
prescribed, then Plaintiffs can 
continue to pursue the merits of 
their claims in Delaware. 
 
App. at 387.  By their own acknowledgement then, 
Appellants were forum shopping.  They wanted to keep the 
same litigation going in two different federal fora 
simultaneously to see in which one they would fare better.  If 
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the Louisiana Supreme Court ruled in their favor, then the 
Appellants would elect to proceed in Louisiana because that 
issue would have been settled.  However, if the Louisiana 
District Court and the Supreme Court of Louisiana ruled 
against them on the statute of limitations issue, they would 
then continue their litigation in Delaware.  The Appellants 
could have asked the Delaware District Court to stay their 
claims, but they did not.  Just as we have held that forum 
shopping is a basis for departing from the first-filed rule, see 
Univ. of Pa., 850 F.2d at 976, it can also be a basis for 
enforcing the rule.  Here, the Appellants not only filed first, 
but filed second as well.  This duplication of litigation was of 
their own making and it was not an abuse of discretion for the 
Delaware District Court to dismiss their second-filed 
complaint with prejudice, instead of staying the matter. 
 
 We are also concerned that finding error in the 
Delaware District Court’s dismissal here could create a “no 
dismissal” rule for these type of cases.  That is, when faced 
with a second-filed action, a district court would only have 
discretion to stay or transfer while the first-filed action is 
pending.  Such a rule, we believe, is inconsistent with our 
current jurisprudence, which clearly states that application of 
the first-filed rule be guided by principles of “fundamental 
fairness . . . [and] dictates the need for fashioning a flexible 
response to the issue of concurrent jurisdiction.”  Univ. of 
Pa., 850 F.2d at 977 (internal citation and quotation marks 
omitted).  Dismissing a matter—with or without prejudice— 
is part of a flexible response.  Therefore, because the first-
filed rule is flexible in nature, it does not proscribe the 
remedy of dismissal, nor does it mandate the remedy of a stay 
or transfer.  In fact, our jurisprudence far from imposes such 
bright-line rules.  We have instructed that a district court is 
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merely “bound to acknowledge these [equitable] principles” 
but the “term ‘discretion’ denotes the absence of a hard and 
fast rule.”  Id. (internal citations and quotation marks 
omitted). 
 
 Here, the District Court acknowledged the relevant 
considerations of the first-filed rule, and was persuaded to 
dismiss the second-filed actions.  The District Court weighed 
heavily that the Appellants were blatantly forum shopping 
and were attempting to get a second bite at the proverbial 
apple.  We can say then, that the Delaware District Court’s 
calculation of “fundamental fairness” was guided by “what is 
right and equitable under the circumstances and the law,” 
especially in light of the fact that the Appellants’ attempt to 
evade Louisiana law “violates the equitable basis for the 
rule.”  Id. at 977-78. 
 
 Further, it is well within a district court’s discretion to 
dismiss a second-filed action because a district court has an 
inherent power to control its docket and dismiss a duplicative 
action.  See In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 685 F.2d 810, 
817 (3d Cir. 1982) (“We will not interfere with a trial court’s 
control of its docket except upon the clearest showing that the 
procedures have resulted in actual and substantial prejudice to 
the complaining litigant.” (quotation marks omitted)); Curtis 
v. Citibank, N.A., 226 F.3d 133, 138 (2d Cir. 2000) (stating 
that a district court, “[a]s part of its general power to 
administer its docket . . . may stay or dismiss a suit that is 
duplicative of another federal court suit.”).  And, finding that 
the District Court abused its discretion here would require us 
to determine that it made a clear error in judgment, i.e., that it 
acted outside the scope of its discretion.  Hanover Potato 
Prods., 989 F.2d at 127.  To do so, we believe, would require 
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us to retroactively limit the scope of a district court’s 
discretion when faced with a second-filed action. 
 
 While the first-filed rule does admit some exceptions, 
there are none present in this case that warrant a departure 
from the rule.  See Univ. of Pa., 850 F.2d at 976-977 
(surveying the “proper bases for departing from the rule” and 
noting that the “letter and spirit of the ... rule ... are grounded 
on equitable principles”).  Appellants bring several arguments 
as to why their Delaware actions should be exempt from the 
first-filed rule, but they are all unavailing.  First, Appellants 
argue that they should be exempted from the rule because 
invoking it would frustrate their choice of forum.  This 
argument is nonsensical.  Appellants chose to file in 
Louisiana first.  Indeed, the Delaware District Court honored 
the Appellant’s choice of forum:  Louisiana.  The Appellants 
also argue that the first-filed rule does not apply because they 
filed both the Louisiana and Delaware themselves.  It is true 
that most first-filed rule issues arise where a plaintiff files in 
one district and then the defendant counter-sues in another 
(or, for example, seeks a declaratory judgment in the second 
district).  There is no authority, however, which holds that the 
first-filed rule only applies in cases where the filings are 
initiated by different parties.  For the rule to apply, all that is 
necessary is for the later filed action to involve the same 
parties and issues that are already before another federal 
court.  Univ. of Pa., 850 F.2d at 971–72 (citing Triangle 
Conduit & Cable Co. v. Nat'l Elec. Products Corp., 125 F.2d 
1008, 1009 (3d Cir. 1941).  It does not matter that the cases 
were commenced by the same party, in this case, the 
Appellants.  Further, the principal reason for the first-filed 
rule is the avoidance of duplicative litigation, so it cannot 
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matter whether the same party brought both suits—what 
matters is whether the second suit is duplicative of the first.   
 
 Next, Appellants maintain that the first-filed rule 
should not apply here because litigating this matter in 
Delaware makes “eminent sense.”  Appellants’ Br. at 31.  
Perhaps there is some sense in litigating this matter in 
Delaware, but the Appellants chose not to do so, instead filing 
their complaint in Louisiana.  As we have already determined, 
the Appellants filed a second, duplicative case in Delaware to 
hedge their bets against an unfavorable outcome in Louisiana.  
This is forum shopping, which never makes “eminent sense.”  
Id.   
 
 Finally, Appellants argue that their duplicative 
Delaware filing is a “reasonable response” to the Appellees’ 
history of delaying tactics.  A review of the record could 
reasonably leave one with the impression that the Appellees 
took full advantage of any opportunity to procedurally stall 
and/or delay these lawsuits over the decades.  However, that 
is not a reason to abandon the first-filed rule.  When 
reviewing the first-filed rule, we concern ourselves only with 
the two cases at issue – not any other procedural issues or 
history of related, but irrelevant litigation. 
 
C. Appellee Chiquita Brands International and Personal 
Jurisdiction 
 
 In a separate order, the Delaware District Court held 
that it lacked personal jurisdiction over Appellee Chiquita 
Brands International, and granted its motion to dismiss.  We 
review de novo the District Court’s dismissal for lack of 
personal jurisdiction, Eurofins Pharma U.S. Holdings v. 
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BioAlliance Pharma S.A., 623 F.3d 147, 155 (3d Cir. 2010), 
and we review the District Court’s decision denying the 
Appellants’  request to conduct jurisdictional discovery for an 
abuse of discretion.  Id. at 157.  We hold that the District 
Court did not err by dismissing Appellee Chiquita for lack of 
personal jurisdiction and denying the Appellants 
jurisdictional discovery.  
  
 Two types of personal jurisdiction exist: general and 
specific.  Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia S.A. v. Hall, 
466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984).  General jurisdiction is present 
when a plaintiff’s claim arises out of the defendant's 
“continuous and systematic” contacts with the forum state.  
General jurisdiction can exist even if the cause of action is 
unrelated to the defendant’s activities in the forum state.  
Specific jurisdiction exists when the plaintiff’s claim arises 
out of the defendant’s activities within the forum such that the 
defendant could reasonably anticipate being hauled into the 
state’s courts.  Vetrotex Certainteed Corp. v. Consl. Fiber 
Glass Prods. Co., 75 F.3d 147, 151 (3d Cir. 1995).  
Appellants make no argument that the District Court had 
specific personal jurisdiction over Chiquita Brands.   
 
 Recently, the United States Supreme Court reviewed 
the requirements to establish general jurisdiction in Daimler 
AG v. Bauman, ––– U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 746, 760-61 (2014).  
There, the Supreme Court noted that when determining 
general jurisdiction, the appropriate consideration is whether 
a defendant’s “‘affiliations with the State are so continuous 
and systematic as to render [it] essentially at home in the 
forum State.’”  Id. at 761 (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires 
Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 2846, 
2851 (2011)) (alteration in original).  The Supreme Court 
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pointed out that for a corporation, “the place of incorporation 
and principal place of business” are where it is “at home” and 
are, therefore, the paradig[m] bases for jurisdiction.  Id. at 
760 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).  
Goodyear, therefore, makes it “incredibly difficult to 
establish general jurisdiction in a forum other than the place 
of incorporation or principal place of business.”  Monkton Ins. 
Services, Ltd. v. Ritter, 768 F.3d 429, 432 (5th Cir. 2014) 
(citations omitted).  Chiquita Brands International argues that 
it was never ‘at home’ in Delaware, and we agree.  The 
company is not incorporated in Delaware and does not 
maintain an office there.  Nor, we note, does the company 
supervise its business from that state.  Indeed, as the 
Delaware District Court found, Chiquita is a national 
company and its products are found across the country.  In 
Goodyear, the Supreme Court seems to reject the idea that 
national corporations are subject to general jurisdiction 
throughout the country.  Goodyear, 131 S.Ct. at 2855-56.5   
   
 Nothing on the record suggests that Chiquita Brands 
International is any more active in Delaware than it is in other 
states.  Nor do any of its activities in moving and selling its 
products lead to a finding that its principal place of business 
                                              
5 Nor, as the Appellants suggest, does maintaining an 
interactive website subject a national corporation to general 
jurisdiction in a particular state.  We have specifically held 
that “the mere operation of a commercially interactive web 
site should not subject the operator to jurisdiction anywhere 
in the world.”  Toys “R” Us, Inc., v. Step Two S.A., 318 F.3d 
446, 454 (3d Cir. 2003).   
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is Delaware.  The District Court, therefore, correctly 
dismissed this Appellee for a lack of personal jurisdiction.6   
 
IV. 
 In the end, we simply cannot say that the District Court 
abused its discretion in dismissing this case with prejudice.  A 
district court’s discretion is necessarily broad so as to handle 
the concerns associated with forum shopping and the first-
filed rule.  This discretion must include the ability to dismiss 
a case with prejudice, especially in a case such as this one 
where a party’s forum shopping is so clearly on display.  
Therefore, and in light of the foregoing, we conclude that the 
Delaware District Court did not abuse its discretion in 
dismissing the Appellants’ actions in favor of the first-filed 
litigation in Louisiana.  We also find no error in the Delaware 
District Court’s dismissal of Appellee Chiquita Brands 
International for a lack of jurisdiction.  Therefore, for the 
foregoing reasons, we will affirm the Delaware District 
Court’s orders. 
 
                                              
6 We also reject the Appellants’ contention that the District 
Court abused its discretion in denying discovery for purposes 
of establishing jurisdiction. 
  
Fuentes, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
 
 More than two hundred plantation workers brought 
this suit alleging their employers and certain chemical 
companies knowingly exposed them to toxic pesticides over a 
period of many years. As a result, they say, they have injured 
kidneys, are infertile, and are at heightened risk of cancer. 
Twenty years after first bringing suit, no court has heard the 
merits of their claims. Because the Louisiana court dismissed 
on procedural grounds, the Delaware District Court’s 
dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claims—with prejudice—
effectively ends the plaintiffs’ lawsuit. The majority’s 
affirmance of that decision, i.e., the dismissal with prejudice 
of a duplicate claim filed in a second court, is not supported 
by our caselaw and is contrary to the decisions of the only 
other Courts of Appeals to have addressed the issue.1 
                                              
1  As discussed below, three other Courts of Appeals have 
addressed the appropriate disposition of second-filed suits in 
the context of the first-filed rule. None has approved 
dismissal with prejudice of the second-filed action on the 
basis of the rule. See Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension 
Fund v. Paramount Liquor Co., 203 F.3d 442, 444 (7th Cir. 
2000) (holding that second-filed court’s dismissal without 
prejudice was error because “dismissal created an 
unwarranted risk of legal prejudice”);  Asset Allocation & 
Mgmt. Co. v. W. Employers Ins. Co., 892 F.2d 566, 571 (7th 
Cir. 1989) (“[W]hy take chances? It is simpler just to stay the 
second suit.”); Alltrade, Inc. v. Uniweld Products, Inc., 946 
F.2d 622, 629 (9th Cir. 1991) (“[W]here the first-filed action 
presents a likelihood of dismissal, the second-filed suit should 
be stayed, rather than dismissed.”); Burger v. Am. Mar. 
 2 
 
 I agree with the majority opinion that the first-filed 
rule applied to the plaintiffs’ successive filing in Delaware, 
and, as such, that the District Court should have given the 
Louisiana suit priority. But I do not agree that the first-filed 
rule is a basis to terminate a claim that otherwise may be 
prosecuted. That is not something we have ever held before; it 
is contrary to our positions on successive litigation and 
concurrent litigation in other contexts; and it is inappropriate 
in light of the Supreme Court’s command that we must 
adjudicate properly presented cases not heard elsewhere on 
the merits. As our sister circuits have done in like cases, I 
would vacate and remand for further proceedings.2 
I 
 
 In Crosley v. Hazeltine we adopted the first-filed rule: 
a comity-based policy that, when two federal courts possess 
the same case at the same time, the action filed first has 
priority. 3  In E.E.O.C. v. University of Pennsylvania, we 
                                                                                                     
Officers Union, 170 F.3d 184, 1999 WL 46962, at *2 (5th 
Cir. 1999) (“When the jurisdiction of the first-filed court to 
hear the dispute is uncertain, it is an abuse of discretion to 
dismiss the claims in the second-filed court with prejudice, as 
it creates the risk that the merits of the claims could never be 
addressed.”). 
 2 I agree with the majority opinion’s determination that the 
District Court lacked personal jurisdiction over defendant 
Chiquita Brands. Hence, I dissent in part.   
3 See Crosley Corp. v. Hazeltine Corp., 122 F.2d 925, 929-30 
(3d Cir. 1941) (adopting “Chief Justice Marshall[’s] salutary 
rule that, ‘In all cases of concurrent jurisdiction, the court 
which first has possession of the subject must decide it.’”) 
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elaborated on Crosley and discussed various scenarios where, 
for equitable reasons, that presumption should not apply.4 
These decisions have a clear, but limited, applicability to this 
appeal. They mean that the District Court correctly concluded 
that the Louisiana suit should have priority.  
 
 The difficult question here, however, is not whether 
the first-filed rule applies. Once we determine the rule 
applies, we must still decide whether it is permissible—solely 
on the basis of the policy—to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims 
with prejudice rather than stay the action or dismiss it without 
prejudice.5 As the majority opinion acknowledges, the claims 
                                                                                                     
(quoting Smith v. McIver, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 532, 535 
(1824)); see also First City Nat'l Bank & Trust v. Simmons, 
878 F.2d 76, 79 (2d Cir. 1989) (“[W]here there are two 
competing lawsuits, the first suit should have priority, absent 
the showing of balance of convenience or special 
circumstances giving priority to the second.”); Orthmann v. 
Apple River Campground, Inc., 765 F.2d 119, 121 (8th Cir. 
1985) (“[C]ourts follow a ‘first to file’ rule that where two 
courts have concurrent jurisdiction, the first court in which 
jurisdiction attaches has priority to consider the case.”). 
4 E.E.O.C. v. Univ. of Pa., 850 F.2d 969, 971-72, 976-77 (3d 
Cir. 1988) (discussing equitable limitations to the “policy of 
comity”).  
5 “The primary meaning of ‘dismissal without prejudice’ . . . 
is dismissal without barring the plaintiff from returning later, 
to the same court, with the same underlying claim.” Semtek 
Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 505-06 
(2001) (citing Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed. 1999)).  
 4 
 
were not heard on the merits in Louisiana 6  and, under 
ordinary preclusion principles, are otherwise free to proceed 
in Delaware. 7  Nor, likely, were the plaintiffs’ claims in 
Delaware time-barred under Delaware’s statute of 
limitations.8 
 
 Having concluded that the first-filed rule applied, the 
District Court believed the possible options available to it 
were “transfer to the Eastern District of Louisiana, stay, or 
                                              
6 Maj. Op. at 6 (“To our knowledge, no court—federal or 
state—has ever reviewed the actual merits of Appellants’ 
claims”). 
7 “Res judicata bars a claim litigated between the same parties 
. . . in earlier litigation where the claim arises from the same 
set of facts as a claim adjudicated on the merits in the earlier 
litigation.” Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 
277 (3d Cir. 2014). “The traditional rule is that expiration of 
the applicable statute of limitations merely bars the remedy 
and does not extinguish the substantive right, so that 
dismissal on that ground does not have claim-preclusive 
effect in other jurisdictions with longer, unexpired limitations 
periods.” Semtek, 531 U.S. at 504. 
8 Dow Chem. Corp. v. Blanco, 67 A.3d 392, 399 (Del. 2013) 
(in case arising from the same facts as the instant one, 
concluding that Delaware recognizes cross-jurisdictional 
tolling). 
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dismissal.” 9  The majority opinion agrees, including as to 
dismissal with prejudice. On the majority opinion’s view, the 
first-filed rule “permits the district courts, in their discretion, 
to stay, transfer, or dismiss cases that are duplicates of those 
brought previously in other federal fora.” 10  The majority 
opinion cites to no decision of our court for this position.11 
Meanwhile, neither Crosley nor University of Pennsylvania12 
contain anything supportive of dismissal with prejudice, let 
alone endorse district court discretion to dispose of a second-
                                              
9 Chavez v. Dole Food Co. Inc., No. 12-697-RGA, 2012 WL 
3600307, at *2 (D. Del. Aug. 21, 2012). The District Court 
did not cite to any decision of our court for this proposition. 
10 Maj. Op. at 5. 
11 Rather, the majority opinion cites to a Ninth Circuit case, 
Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr., et al v. Shalala, 125 F.3d 765, 769 
(9th Cir. 1997). Neither Shalala nor any other Ninth Circuit 
case has approved of dismissal with prejudice under the first-
filed rule, nor even dismissal without prejudice where the 
first-filed suit may not be adjudicated on the merits. Much to 
the contrary, the position of the Ninth Circuit is that “where 
the first-filed action presents a likelihood of dismissal, the 
second-filed suit should be stayed, rather than dismissed.” See 
Alltrade, 946 F.2d at 629.  
12  Nor our other first-filed rule cases: Triangle Conduit & 
Cable Co. v. Nat’l Elec. Products Corp., 125 F.2d 1008 (3d 
Cir. 1942) (en banc) and Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Fire 
Equip. Co., 189 F.2d 31 (3d Cir. 1951) (en banc) aff’d, 342 
U.S. 180 (1952).  
 6 
 
filed case in any manner it chooses. 13  Indeed, the proper 
disposition of a second-filed case did not come up in Crosley 
or University of Pennsylvania. 
 
 Crosley involved an interlocutory appeal from a first-
filed court’s denial of a motion to enjoin second-filed, 
duplicative proceedings in another district court. Under our 
newly-adopted first-filed rule, we “conclude[d] that the 
District Court . . . having the power to issue the preliminary 
injunction prayed for, abused its discretion in refusing to 
exercise that power.”14 We had no occasion to say anything 
about what may be done by second-filed courts, and we did 
not do so in dicta. Meanwhile, to the extent we can glean 
something here from Crosley’s instruction to first-filed 
courts, it is that when a first-filed court enjoins prosecution of 
                                              
13 The majority opinion separately suggests we have limited 
review over a decision to dismiss with prejudice because it is 
part of the district court’s docket management authority. Maj. 
Op. at 15. I do not see how a dismissal with prejudice, which 
enters final judgment on a complaint, falls within the rubric of 
docket management. Indeed, In re Fine Paper Antitrust 
Litigation, which the majority opinion cites, addressed a 
challenge to the district court’s calendaring of proceedings. 
See 685 F.2d 810, 818 (3d Cir. 1982) (“We find no abuse of 
discretion by the district judge in his scheduling of discovery 
or of the trial.”). Curtis v. Citibank, N.A. is not contrary to the 
dissent, either. In Curtis, the Second Circuit reversed the 
District Court’s dismissal of a purportedly duplicate case on 
the basis that the cases were not actually duplicates. See 226 
F.3d 133, 136 (2d Cir. 2000). 
14 Crosley, 122 F.2d at 930. 
 7 
 
later-filed proceedings, the effect is that of staying—not 
dismissing—those other cases.15 
 University of Pennsylvania did involve a second-filed 
court. But the second-filed court in that case determined that, 
for equitable reasons, the first-filed rule did not apply. 16 
University of Pennsylvania is a landmark first-filed rule case 
because of its comprehensive discussion of the considerations 
that bear upon whether or not the first-filed suit is entitled to 
priority. 17  But because we upheld the District Court’s 
determination that the first-filed suit was not, in that case, 
entitled to priority, we had no occasion to say anything about 
what a second-filed court is to do when the rule does apply.18  
                                              
15 Cf. Asset Allocation, 892 F.2d at 571 (affirming portion of 
first-filed court’s order enjoining party from proceeding in 
second-filed forum, but reversing portion of order requiring 
party to dismiss the parallel action). 
16 Univ. of Pa., 850 F.2d at 972.  
17 See id. at 971-72, 976-77. 
18 If anything, University of Pennsylvania is supportive of the 
dissent. In a footnote, we stated we were “puzzled” that the 
EEOC did not move to transfer or stay the University’s 
abusive and anticipatory first-filed suit in the District for the 
District of Columbia. See id. at 976 n.4. In doing so, we cited 
to a statement of the Fifth Circuit that “In addition to outright 
dismissal, it sometimes may be appropriate to transfer the 
action or to stay it.” Id. (citing W. Gulf Mar. Ass’n v. ILA 
Deep Sea Local 24, 751 F.2d 721, 729 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1985)). 
As to dismissal, that Fifth Circuit decision stated that “a 
district court may dismiss an action where the issues 
 8 
 
  In short, the propriety of dismissal with prejudice 
under the first-filed rule is a question of first impression in 
our circuit.19 We should address it with reference to the view 
of our sister circuits and leading treatises, considerations of 
comity and equity, and the rules and principles we apply in 
parallel contexts.  
II 
 
 Unlike our Court, the Seventh, Ninth, and Fifth 
Circuits have addressed whether and when a second-filed 
court may dismiss a case on the basis of the first-filed rule. 
                                                                                                     
presented can be resolved in an earlier-filed action pending in 
another district court.” W. Gulf Mar. Ass’n, 751 F.2d at 729. I 
agree wholeheartedly. As discussed below, presented with a 
situation where a second court dismissed with prejudice 
despite a likelihood that the first court would not resolve the 
issues presented, the Fifth Circuit vacated the dismissal. See 
Burger v. Am. Mar. Officers Union, 170 F.3d 184, 1999 WL 
46962 (5th Cir. 1999).  
19 That we have never previously reviewed a district court’s 
dismissal with prejudice under the first-filed rule underscores 
the unusualness of the dismissal with prejudice in this case. 
Of course, we would not ordinarily have jurisdiction to 
review a stay, transfer, or non-final dismissal. See Michelson 
v. Citicorp Nat. Servs., Inc., 138 F.3d 508, 516 (3d Cir. 1998) 
(emphasizing “the limited extent to which stays are 
appealable”); Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223 F.3d 165, 172 
(3d Cir. 2000) (“[A] dismissal without prejudice is not a final 
and appealable order under § 1291, unless the plaintiff can no 
longer amend the complaint or unless the plaintiff declares an 
intention to stand on the complaint as dismissed.”).  
 9 
 
These cases show that dismissal with prejudice under the 
first-filed rule should be limited to cases where some other 
legal basis—res judicata, jurisdiction, mootness, or the like—
shows the plaintiffs are clearly unable to prosecute their 
claims before the abstaining court. Applying this basic rule, 
these Courts of Appeals have each reversed a second-filed 
court’s dismissal where, as here, there was an apparent 
possibility that the claims at issue would not or could not be 
heard in the first-filed forum.  
 
 Beginning with the Seventh Circuit, two cases there 
are on point. First is Asset Allocation v. Western Employers.20 
Though the procedural posture differs from the instant case, 
the effect was the same: a first-filed court ordered the 
defendant to dismiss a reciprocal action it had filed involving 
the same issues in a second court. 21  While affirming the 
portion of the first court’s order enjoining the parties from 
proceeding in the second forum, 22  the Seventh Circuit 
reversed the dismissal order. The court explained that if the 
first suit was dismissed before litigation was “well-
advanced,” there would be no reason to forbid pursuing the 
claim in the second-filed forum. Warning that statute of 
limitations problems could cause claims to needlessly go 
                                              
20 Asset Allocation & Mgmt. Co. v. W. Emp’rs Ins. Co., 892 
F.2d 566 (7th Cir. 1989). 
21 Id. at 571. 
22 Cf. Crosley, 122 F.2d at 929 (holding district court abused 
its discretion by failing to enjoin second-filed duplicative 
proceedings). 
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unheard, the court asked, “[W]hy take chances? It is simpler 
just to stay the second suit.”23  
 The Seventh Circuit again focused on the cost of 
dismissing unheard claims in Central States v. Paramount 
Liquor, which held that a second-filed court’s dismissal 
without prejudice was error because, compared to a stay, 
“dismissal created an unwarranted risk of legal prejudice.”24 
                                              
23 Asset Allocation, 892 F.2d at 571. The court noted, “for 
completeness, . . . that if the second suit is harassing—
vexatious—an abuse of process, the proper disposition is 
neither a stay nor a dismissal without prejudice; it is dismissal 
with prejudice, so that the plaintiff cannot refile suit.” Id. I do 
not disagree that there is an “equitable doctrine that bars 
vexatious litigation.” See id. at 572. This is “independent” 
from the first-filed rule, however, which applies to any 
“second, nonharassing lawsuit (albeit one identical to the 
first).” Id. Here, there is no dispute that the plaintiffs filed suit 
in Delaware to obtain relief from the defendants rather than to 
harass them.   
24 Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. Paramount 
Liquor Co., 203 F.3d 442, 445 (7th Cir. 2000) (“Central 
States”). The Seventh Circuit in Central States observed that 
dismissal is more likely to be appropriate when the same 
party brings duplicate suits than when opposing parties bring 
dueling suits. As an example, it cited to Serlin v. Arthur 
Andersen & Co., 3 F.3d 221 (1993), which upheld the 
dismissal with prejudice of a second-filed action within the 
same district court that was procedurally dismissed for failure 
to timely serve process. The Serlin court affirmed given the 
first-case ended because of “the plaintiff’s own failure to 
follow the rules” and unwillingness to dismiss the earlier case 
 11 
 
The general rule, the court explained, is that “when comity 
among tribunals justifies giving priority to a particular suit, 
the other action (or actions) should be stayed, rather than 
dismissed, unless it is absolutely clear that dismissal cannot 
adversely affect any litigant’s interests.”25  
 
  In Alltrade, Inc. v. Uniweld Products, Inc., the Ninth 
Circuit followed the Seventh Circuit’s lead. 26  Alltrade 
determined that a second-filed court’s dismissal without 
prejudice was problematic even as it was proper for the 
                                                                                                     
voluntarily—without prejudice—and then refile it with proper 
service. See id. at 224. 
For our purposes, Serlin was not a first-filed rule case, and the 
particular context of a failure to follow procedural rules in the 
same district court presents different considerations than 
when a different federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction 
determines a complaint is time-barred. Cf. Walton v. Eaton 
Corp., 563 F.2d 66, 70-71 (3d Cir. 1977) (en banc) (discussed 
infra at n.47).  
25  Central States, 203 F.3d at 444. Judge Easterbrook 
presented this as a rule of general applicability for all 
concurrent litigation contexts. Reformulating the principle in 
a case where the same plaintiff filed identical suits in the 
same district, the court in Gleash v. Yuswak wrote that “even 
when prudence calls for putting a redundant suit on hold, it 
must be stayed rather than dismissed unless there is no 
possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff.” See Gleash v. 
Yuswak, 308 F.3d 758, 760 (7th Cir. 2002). 
26 Alltrade, Inc. v. Uniweld Prods., Inc., 946 F.2d 622 (9th 
Cir. 1991).  
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second court to give priority to the first court. To wit, if the 
first-filed case terminated without an adjudication on the 
merits, the district court’s dismissal meant the plaintiff 
“would have to file a new suit in [the second court] and 
would risk encountering statute of limitations problems.”27 A 
stay, on the other hand, would have preserved the district 
court’s flexibility to secure the rights of plaintiff and 
defendant alike. Specifically, “should the [first] court dismiss 
the appeal and transfer what remains of the first-filed action, 
the stay could be lifted and the actions consolidated. On the 
other hand, should the [first] court decide that it has 
jurisdiction . . . , the stay could be lifted and the second-filed 
action dismissed or transferred.”28 Citing to Asset Allocation, 
the Ninth Circuit concluded that, “where the first-filed action 
presents a likelihood of dismissal, the second-filed suit should 
be stayed, rather than dismissed.”29 
 
 Finally, there is Burger v. American Marine Officers 
Union, where the Fifth Circuit reversed a second-filed court’s 
dismissal with prejudice.30 The decision to reverse drew upon 
Alltrade, Asset Allocation, and Fifth Circuit caselaw holding 
that, when a plaintiff files duplicative suits in the same federal 
district, dismissal with prejudice is appropriate only when res 
judicata or collateral estoppel give preclusive effect to the 
                                              
27 Id. at 629. 
28 Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
29 Id. 
30 Burger v. Am. Mar. Officers Union, 170 F.3d 184, 1999 
WL 46962 (5th Cir. 1999). 
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first proceeding. 31  In light of these authorities, the court 
explained that “[w]hen the jurisdiction of the first-filed court 
to hear the dispute is uncertain, it is an abuse of discretion to 
dismiss the claims in the second-filed court with prejudice, as 
it creates the risk that the merits of the claims could never be 
addressed.”32 Instead, the Fifth Circuit held, the second-filed 
court should have stayed the proceedings or dismissed 
without prejudice.33  
 
 The leading treatises are in concert with our sister 
courts. Speaking of the first-filed rule as a doctrine of 
abstention—meaning a judge-made canon by which a court 
declines to exercise its jurisdiction—Wright and Miller say 
that “it is well settled that if the same issues are presented in 
an action pending in another federal court, one of these courts 
may stay the action before it or even in some circumstances 
enjoin going forward in the other federal court.”34 They say 
nothing of dismissal. Moore’s Federal Practice, meanwhile, 
takes dismissal on directly, writing that “if the first-filed 
                                              
31  Id. (citing Dillard v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & 
Smith, Inc., 961 F.2d 1148, 1160-61 (5th Cir. 1992)); see also 
Cadle Co. v. Whataburger of Alice, Inc., 174 F.3d 599, 604 
(5th Cir. 1999) (stating that a second-filed court applying the 
first-filed rule “is not binding the litigants before it to a ruling 
of the first [court]”). 
32 Burger, 1999 WL 46962 at *2. 
33 Id. at *3. 
34 17A Charles Alan Wright et al., Fed. Prac. & Proc. Juris. § 
4247 (3d ed.) (“Avoiding Duplicative Litigation”). 
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action is vulnerable to dismissal on jurisdictional or statute of 
limitations grounds, the court in the second-filed action 
should stay it or transfer it, rather than outright dismiss it.”35 
This circumstance is precisely the one presented in this case. 
 
 Then there are our district courts, the vast majority of 
which have applied the first-filed rule by staying the second 
case, transferring it, or dismissing it without prejudice.36 The 
                                              
35 17 Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 111.13[1][o][ii][A] (3d ed.). 
36  See Premier Payments Online, Inc. v. Payment Sys. 
Worldwide, 848 F. Supp. 2d 513, 523 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (“When 
the first-filed rule applies, a court has the option of dismissing 
the second-filed case without prejudice, staying it for the 
duration of the first-filed case, or transferring it to the forum 
where the first-filed case was brought.”); e.g. CTI Sys. SA v. 
Herr Indus., Inc., 2015 WL 1073667 (E.D. Pa. 2015) 
(dismissal without prejudice, with express leave to re-file if 
first court was unable to grant a remedy); Englebert v. 
McGraw-Hill Global Educ. Holdings LLC, 2014 WL 
3109884 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (stay); Plange v. Christ Hosp., 2014 
WL 1790169, at *5 (D.N.J. 2014) (stay); Miller v. 
Careminders Home Care, Inc., 2014 WL 1779362, at *4 
(D.N.J. 2014) (transfer); DePuy Synthes Sales, Inc. v. Gill, 
2013 WL 5816328, at *11 (D.N.J. 2013) (transfer); Synthes, 
Inc. v. Knapp, 978 F. Supp. 2d 450, 463 (E.D. Pa. 2013) 
(transfer); Inter City Tire & Auto Ctr., Inc. v. Michelin N. 
Am., Inc., 2013 WL 5567564, at *3 (D.N.J. 2013) (transfer); 
Wheaton Indus., Inc. v. Aalto Scientific, Ltd., 2013 WL 
4500321, at *5 (D.N.J. 2013) (transfer); D & L Distribution, 
LLC v. Agxplore Int'l, LLC, 959 F. Supp. 2d 757, 772 (E.D. 
Pa. 2013) (transfer); Mahmoud v. Rite Aid Corp., 2012 WL 
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district court here is the only one I am aware of that dismissed 
a second case with prejudice despite the open likelihood that 
the earlier case would not adjudicate the matter on the 
merits.37  
 
 Our sister Courts of Appeals, the leading treatises, and 
most of our district courts agree: the applicability of the first-
filed rule alone is insufficient to justify dismissal with 
prejudice, and dismissal with prejudice is inappropriate under 
the rule where, compared to a stay, it could cause properly 
presented claims to go unheard.   
 
III 
 
                                                                                                     
3560645, at *6 (D.N.J. 2012) (stay); Worthington v. Bayer 
Healthcare, LLC, 2012 WL 1079716, at *8 (D.N.J. 2012) 
(dismissal “with leave to re-file if [first] action is dismissed 
on procedural grounds”); Vinik Marine, Inc. v. Ironhead 
Marine, Inc., 2012 WL 1067737, at *4 (D.N.J. 2012) 
(dismissal “without prejudice since the [first] court did not 
address the claims on the merits”). 
37 The defendants bring but three examples of first-filed rule 
dismissals to our attention. In one case the dismissal was 
issued with express leave to re-file if the first forum 
dismissed on procedural grounds. See Worthington v. Bayer 
Healthcare, LLC, 2012 WL 1079716 (D.N.J. 2012). In the 
others there was no apparent possibility that the first court 
would not adjudicate the case on the merits. See Time Warner 
Cable, Inc. v. GPNE Corp., 497 F. Supp. 2d 584, 586 (D. Del. 
2007); Funkhouser v. Chi-Chi's, Inc., No. 02:05CV638, 2005 
WL 2545300 (W.D. Pa. 2005). 
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 The majority opinion offers a few reasons why we 
should depart from the consensus viewpoint and embrace 
dismissal with prejudice as squarely within the authority of 
the second-filed court. For one thing, the majority opinion 
notes, dismissal with prejudice satisfies the primary goals of 
the first-filed rule in that it avoids duplicative proceedings, 
which serves comity and efficiency and prevents conflicting 
judgments.38 For another, the majority opinion sees dismissal 
with prejudice as salutary when, as here, the same party filed 
both suits out of concern about a procedural dismissal in the 
first forum.39 To the extent the plaintiffs “wanted to keep the 
same litigation going in two different federal fora 
simultaneously to see in which one they would fare better,” 
the majority opinion sees dismissal with prejudice as “an 
appropriate response to the Appellants’ own litigation 
strategy.” 40  From this perspective, our sister Courts of 
Appeals’ reversals might be distinguished, as in those cases 
the successive suits were filed by different parties.  
 
 I find these arguments unpersuasive. A second-filed 
court avoids duplicative litigation, conflicting judgments, and 
cross-district frictions whether it stays the matter or dismisses 
it. A stay also prevents gamesmanship. Regardless of who 
files each suit, a stay confines litigants to the first-filed forum 
until the conclusion of its proceedings. Res judicata and 
collateral estoppel would then prevent the relitigation of any 
claims that were, or could have been, previously heard on the 
merits. The additional benefit of a stay, as our sister Courts of 
                                              
38 Maj. Op. at 12. 
39 Maj. Op. at 12-13.  
40 Maj. Op. at 12-13.  
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Appeals have emphasized, is that it preserves the ability of 
litigants to advance claims that the first-filed forum does not 
allow to be adjudicated on the merits. This danger of 
litigation prejudice is the same whether the two suits were 
brought by the same parties or opposing ones. The reasoning 
of our sister Courts of Appeals is as operative here as in the 
cases before them. 
 
 I disagree, moreover, with the assertion that the 
plaintiffs sought to maintain two actions to see in which one 
they would fare better. The plaintiffs explicitly told the 
District Court here, and the one in Louisiana, that they filed 
their claim in Delaware as a precaution in case the Louisiana 
court determined that it could not hear their claims on the 
merits. After all, if the Louisiana court dismissed their claim 
without any assessment of the merits, the District Court here 
was their court of only resort, and filing sooner rather than 
later helped ensure timeliness in Delaware. This is not a 
litigation strategy designed to get the plaintiffs multiple bites 
at the apple or a more favorable judge or decisional law than 
what was offered in Louisiana. Rather, this is a litigation 
strategy designed to get the plaintiffs a seat at the table to 
present their claims to a single U.S. District Court.  
 
 As to the purported inequities of successive litigation 
generally, forum shopping is indeed a recognized basis for 
overriding the first-filed rule’s presumption that the first court 
to receive a case should have priority.41 It does not follow, 
however, that concurrent filings—whether by the same or 
different parties—is a basis for dismissing a case with 
                                              
41 See Univ. of Pa., 850 F.2d at 972. 
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prejudice such that the dispute is never heard at all. Indeed, 
the majority opinion’s forum shopping concerns are nowhere 
to be seen in our cases addressing other successive and/or 
concurrent litigation situations. Under our rule of res judicata, 
for example, litigants are entitled to bring—and our courts 
required to entertain—new filings of previously presented 
claims unless those claims were previously adjudicated on the 
merits. 42  Far from the majority opinion’s view that a 
successive filing of an unheard claim should be barred as 
inequitable, res judicata reflects the principle that, when the 
first court that a plaintiff petitions is unable to entertain her 
claims, she may go to another and another until she finds one 
that can. Under ordinary res judicata principles, the plaintiffs 
here would not be precluded from proceeding in Delaware.43 
 
 Our cases in other successive and/or concurrent 
litigation contexts track the same contours as the res judicata 
rule. Where a plaintiff has filed successive duplicative suits 
within the same district court, we have expressly recognized 
only stay, consolidation, and dismissal without prejudice as 
                                              
42 Blunt, 767 F.3d at 277.  
43  The majority opinion illuminates its departure from res 
judicata principles with its claim that “the procedural posture 
of the first-filed case, on the date the second-filed actions 
were dismissed, is irrelevant to the analysis.” Maj. Op. at 9-
11. If the majority opinion fashioned the first-filed rule 
consistent with res judicata principles, there would be no need 
to fix “a particular moment in time” at which “to take a 
snapshot of the cases.” See Maj. Op. at 11.   
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the options available to the court.44 Compared to that context, 
the case against dismissal with prejudice is stronger under the 
first-filed rule, as parallel cases in different states are more 
likely to involve different personal jurisdictions and/or 
statutes of limitations. Meanwhile, where abstention 
principles counsel deference to a parallel state proceeding,45 
we have repeatedly emphasized the importance of staying—
and not dismissing—the federal case where any of the 
                                              
44 Walton, 563 F.2d at 70-71 (en banc) (Judge Garth observed 
that, “When the district court became aware that the two 
actions begun by Mrs. Walton were virtually identical, it 
could have dismissed her second complaint without prejudice 
or it could have stayed proceedings in the second action until 
judgment was entered in the first”) (emphasis added).   
45  E.g. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 31 (1971) (requiring 
abstention where judgment would interfere with ongoing state 
enforcement proceeding); Colorado River Water 
Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976) 
(permitting abstention in limited circumstances because of 
duplicative state court litigation); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 
U.S. 315 (1943) (affirming abstention in deference to 
complex state administrative proceedings); see also Colorado 
River, 424 U.S. at 817 (“[T]here are principles unrelated to 
considerations of proper constitutional adjudication and 
regard for federal-state relations which govern in situations 
involving the contemporaneous exercise of concurrent 
jurisdictions, either by federal courts or by state and federal 
courts.”). See generally 17A Charles Alan Wright et al., Fed. 
Prac. & Proc. Juris. § 4241 (3d ed.) (“Abstention Generally”). 
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requested relief may be unavailable from the state forum.46 As 
we explained in Feige v. Sechrest, a stay “retains the 
sensitivity for concerns of federalism and comity implicated 
by . . . abstention, while preserving appellants’ right to litigate 
their claims in the federal forum should the [state] courts, for 
jurisdictional or other reasons, fail to adjudicate them.”47   
 
 Our consistent position—that an earlier-filed action 
precludes a later one only if the earlier one has been 
adjudicated on the merits—reflects the fairness principle that 
                                              
46 See, e.g., Feige v. Sechrest, 90 F.3d 846, 851 (3d Cir. 1996) 
(“The entry of a stay rather than a dismissal prevents those 
claims from becoming time-barred should jurisdiction be 
somehow lacking in the [state court], and the preclusion 
doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel will prevent 
their re-litigation in the more likely event that court proceeds 
to judgment.”); Ingersoll-Rand Fin. Corp. v. Callison, 844 
F.2d 133, 138 (3d Cir. 1988) (reversing dismissal under 
Colorado River doctrine because “some matters arguably will 
remain for resolution after the state proceedings” and 
instructing district court to “determine the effect of the 
judgment by applying principles of res judicata to determine 
what issues of fact or law remain in the case”); Monaghan v. 
Deakins, 798 F.2d 632, 635 (3d Cir. 1986) aff’d in part, 
vacated in part on other grounds, 484 U.S. 193 (1988) (“It is 
settled in this circuit that a district court, when abstaining 
from adjudicating a claim for injunctive relief, should stay 
and not dismiss accompanying claims for damages and 
attorney fees when such relief is not available from the 
ongoing state proceedings.”). 
47 Feige, 90 F.3d at 851.  
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litigants are entitled to a single day in court.48 But though 
well-grounded in equity, the position is ultimately one of 
Article III obligation.  
 
 As recently noted by Judge Krause, “the mandate that 
federal courts hear cases within their statutory jurisdiction is a 
bedrock principle of our judiciary.”49 For, “[a]s the Supreme 
Court has instructed on numerous occasions, ‘federal courts 
have a strict duty to exercise the jurisdiction that is conferred 
upon them by Congress.’”50 “Proceed[ing] from the premise 
                                              
48 Cf. In re Global Indus. Technologies, Inc., 645 F.3d 201, 
204, 204 n.4 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc) (describing bankruptcy 
parties as “entitled to be fully heard and to have their 
legitimate objections addressed” and focusing on the 
Bankruptcy Court’s “refusal to give [the appellants] their 
proper place at the litigation table” as “the whole point of this 
appeal”).  
49 In re: One2One Communications, LLC, __ F.3d __, 2015 
WL 4430302 at *9 (3d Cir. July 21, 2015 (Krause, J., 
concurring). 
50 In re Semcrude, L.P., 728 F.3d 314, 326 (3d Cir. 2013) 
(quoting Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706 
(1996)). See also Willcox v. Consol. Gas Co. of New York, 
212 U.S. 19, 40 (1909) (“When a federal court is properly 
appealed to in a case over which it has by law jurisdiction, it 
is its duty to take such jurisdiction.”); Chicot County v. 
Sherwood, 148 U.S. 529, 534 (1893) (“The courts of the 
United States are bound to proceed to judgment and to afford 
redress to suitors before them in every case to which their 
jurisdiction extends.”). “Underlying these assertions is the 
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that ‘[i]n rare circumstances, federal courts can relinquish 
their jurisdiction in favor of another forum,’”51 the unanimous 
Supreme Court in Quackenbush v. Allstate explained how this 
Article III duty constrains the abstention doctrines that are the 
state-federal analogue to the first-filed rule.52 To wit, when 
abstention principles militate against a federal court’s 
exercise of jurisdiction, the abstaining court’s disposition of 
the case depends both on the nature of the claim and, if it is a 
damages claim, the ability of the other forum to hear it.53 
Where there is no other available forum to entertain a 
damages claim before an abstaining court, the Supreme Court 
held that an abstaining court may stay a damages action to 
avoid concurrent litigation, but it may not dismiss it.54 The 
basis of this is that, “[u]nlike the outright dismissal or remand 
of a federal suit, . . . an order merely staying the action ‘does 
                                                                                                     
undisputed constitutional principle that Congress, and not the 
Judiciary, defines the scope of federal jurisdiction within the 
constitutionally permissible bounds.” New Orleans Pub. 
Serv., Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 
358-59 (1989). 
51  One2One Communications, 2015 WL 4430302 at *9 
(Krause, J., concurring) (quoting Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 
722).  
52 Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 716-23, 728, 731. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
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not constitute abnegation of judicial duty . . . [a]s there is only 
postponement of decision for its best fruition.’”55  
 The teaching of Quackenbush is that “where there is 
no other forum and no later exercise of jurisdiction . . . 
relinquishing jurisdiction is not abstention; it’s abdication.”56 
A judge’s primary function is to decide cases within its 
jurisdiction. Judge-made canons of comity and equity cannot 
supplant that duty, and for this reason, too, a district court 
may not properly terminate a claim under the first-filed rule 
that has not, and will not, be heard by any other court. In 
                                              
55  Id. at 721 (quoting La. Power & Light Co. v. City of 
Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 29 (1959)). The Quackenbush Court 
emphasized that the “distinction between . . . dismissals and 
abstention-based decisions merely to stay adjudication of a 
federal suit” is crucial in this respect. Id. at 720. Indeed, it 
accounts for the divergent results of companion cases decided 
on the same day in 1959—Louisiana Power & Light v. City of 
Thibodaux and County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda—
which each involved district court abstentions from exercising 
diversity jurisdiction over an eminent domain action. See id. 
at 721 (comparing Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 with Cnty. of 
Allegheny, 360 U.S. 185). The district court in Thibodaux 
stayed the federal action; the district court in County of 
Allegheny dismissed the federal action; and “[b]ased in large 
measure on this distinction,” the Supreme Court affirmed the 
Thibodaux court and reversed the County of Allegheny court. 
Id. 
56  One2One Communications, 2015 WL 4430302 at *9 
(Krause, J., concurring). 
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short, “the Judiciary has a responsibility to decide cases 
properly before it, even those it ‘would gladly avoid.’”57 
 
 In sum, the vast corpus of successive litigation and 
concurrent litigation authority holds that a second-filed suit 
may not be dismissed with prejudice solely on the basis of 
equity or judicial management. This consistent rejection of 
dismissal with prejudice except as according to some other 
recognized basis—res judicata, jurisdiction, mootness, or the 
like—is well-grounded in both fundamental fairness and the 
constitutional duties of federal courts. Those considerations 
apply as fully here as ever, and they cannot be overcome by 
concern for purported forum shopping.  
 
IV 
 
 For the above reasons, I would say that a second-filed 
action “should be stayed, rather than dismissed, unless it is 
absolutely clear that dismissal cannot adversely affect any 
litigant’s interests.” 58  The District Court’s dismissals with 
                                              
57 Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 
1427 (2012) (quoting Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 
264 (1821)).  
58 See Central States, 203 F.3d at 444. I emphasize that this is 
not a “no dismissal rule.” Maj. Op. at 14. A second-filed court 
may always dismiss with an express caveat that the plaintiff 
has leave to re-file if the first-filed court finds it is unable to 
adjudicate the case on the merits. Worthington v. Bayer 
Healthcare, LLC, 2012 WL 1079716, at *8 (D.N.J. 2012), 
took such an approach, and it is exemplary of how a court can 
dismiss under the first-filed rule without risking prejudice to 
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prejudice were at fundamental odds with this precept, 
needlessly foreclosing the plaintiffs’ final chance at a lone 
hearing on the merits. The premature judgments caused two 
hundred people to be without redress for life-altering injuries, 
and I believe they should be vacated and the case remanded 
for further proceedings.  
 
 I respectfully dissent.  
                                                                                                     
any litigant. Meanwhile, dismissal with prejudice remains 
appropriate in the event that the plaintiff is clearly unable to 
prosecute her claims in the second-filed court.   
